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Abstract: In an attempt to understand better the failure of 
Islamism to exercise any significant impact on the trajec-
tory of Indonesian politics through the twentieth century, 
this article examines the development of Indonesian 
Islamist thought in the early twentieth century and com-
pares it to the growth of secularist nationalist thinking.  
Islamist thinking was slow to arrive at a consciousness of 
Indonesia as specific national place and homeland.  By the 
time Islamist thinkers had begun to develop a clearer sense 
of their own political project, secular nationalist thinkers 
(often indifferent to and sometimes fiercely opposed to 
Islamic and Islamist ideas about the relationship of state to 
religion) had already established the unassailable primacy of  
the idea of Indonesia as an independent sovereign state-in-
the-making and as the vehicle for Indonesians to become 
both modern and prosperous.  Islamists thereafter had no 
option but to seek to accommodate their thinking to the 
dominant paradigm of the idea of Indonesia. 
Keyword: Islamism, nationalist movement, modernist 
Islam, reformist Islam, secularism.  
Introduction 
Why has Indonesian Islamism (by which I mean that understand-
ding which demands that the exercise of politics be grounded upon 
Islam above all else) failed for so long to have a significant, conse-
quential impact on the course of Indonesia’s twentieth century history 
and politics? As Bahtiar Effendy notes, “In Indonesia Islam has long 
been at an impasse in terms of its political relationship with the state.”2  
                                                 
1 I am grateful for the comments of John Butcher, Akh Muzakki, Kees van Dijk and 
Michael Laffan on an earlier version of this paper. 
2 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 2. 
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In beginning to address this problem, I have found it useful to focus 
on an analysis of Islamism’s engagement with the discourses and 
directions of early Indonesian nationalism.  It was there, I shall argue, 
that the seeds of Islamism’s later failures were sown. 
Islam and the Nationalist Narrative 
The received orthodoxy of Indonesia’s coming to be as a modern 
nation-state is, we all know, a determinedly secular one; the narrative 
traces the emergence and struggles of a modernising young elite 
endowed with Westernised visions of nation, progress,  prosperity, and 
tolerance. After some encouraging but ultimately false starts grounded 
in ethnicity, religion and international communism, the nationalist 
narrative takes flight with the inclusivist affirmation of the nation-ness 
of the whole archipelago which, the narrative goes, reaches its natural 
and necessary goal in Sukarno’s proclamation of the independence of 
the Republic of Indonesia in August 1945. 
Scholars and commentators have questioned whether the political 
shape Indonesia eventually took might have taken other forms 
―perhaps a federal state, perhaps a multiplicity of states, perhaps diffe-
rent constitutional architecture― but there has been surprisingly sparse 
analysis of the possibilities of an outcome in which Indonesia shaped 
its sense of self by virtue of the dominance, or even the significant 
input of, the Islamic impulse. The question may be put in variously 
graded ways, ranging from asking why Indonesia did not assume the 
form of an Islamic state to inquiring into why specifically Islamic 
thinking of any kind had such marginal input and importance in the 
final outcome. Laffan has spoken of Anderson’s “heroic invocation” 
of the secular nationalist endeavour in Indonesia, remarking that 
“Anderson was not speaking of a project that identified in any 
substantial way with the faith of the majority of the inhabitants of the 
archipelago,” and asserting the “real need for a re-examination of the 
place of religion in guiding the footsteps of some of Anderson’s 
heroes.”3 For Laffan, “the vision of a linear development of an 
Indonesian nationalism evolving from diverse regional nationalism all 
tied to the Western metropole and class struggle is neither simple nor 
completely satisfying.”4 This article takes up Laffan’s challenge, and in 
                                                 
3 Michael Francis Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma below the 
Winds (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 2. 
4 Ibid., p. 166. 
 
 
 
 
233 
Islam and the Early Indonesian Nationalist Movement 
233 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 01, Number 02, December 2007 
so doing attempts to explain the failure of Islam’s champions to inject 
any wavering into the trajectory of secularised thinking about the 
emerging Indonesian state. 
Indonesian Muslims 
Scholars generally agree that the rise of modern varieties of 
thinking about indigenous identity was occasioned by the Netherlands’ 
final success in melding a new, archipelago-wide political entity which 
it called the Netherlands Indies and, more important, imbuing that 
entity with the essential characteristics of a modern state, a centralised 
form of governance, an efficient bureaucracy staffed by the products 
of modern Western education, and integrating physical and commu-
nications infrastructures ―roads, railways, shipping lines, banks, 
newspapers. 
By far the greater part of the population of this newly fabricated 
Netherlands Indies state of the early twentieth century was Muslim, 
and had long been so. Ricklefs observes of Java in the later eighteenth 
and earlier nineteenth centuries that “nothing in the records of this 
period … implies that it was possible to be Javanese without being 
Muslim.”5  But Islam, like the country itself, was changing. Ricklefs has 
argued vigorously and industriously, if not altogether compellingly, that 
in Java from about the mid-nineteenth there had begun a process of 
polarisation within Islam, resulting in the emergence of “two groups 
defined by their Islamic commitment,”6 devout and pious Muslims 
(putihan or santri) and, in the great majority, abangan, those much less 
strongly attached to orthodox belief and practice, and even of the 
development of a striking if limited sense of outright opposition to 
Islam’s ascendancy.7 
The motor of this change in Java, he argues, was the increasing 
prosperity brought into domestic commercial circles ―“a native 
bourgeoisie of Islamic bent”8― by the transformative operation of the 
Dutch system of forced cultivations, allowing them enhanced status9 
                                                 
5 M.C. Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the 
Early Nineteenth Centuries (Norwalk CT: EastBridge, 2006), p. 225. 
6 Ibid., p. 6. 
7 M.C. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830-1930) 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), p. 86. 
8 Ibid., p. 28. 
9 Ibid., p. 28. 
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and even the chance to avail themselves of the ever-opening 
opportunities to travel to Mecca. There they encountered the 
reforming winds gusting through Middle Eastern Islam, and brought 
that reform-minded thinking home with revivalist enthusiasm. Its 
vigorous introduction may well have excited a deep adverse reaction 
which took gradual shape in the emergence of the abangan, with all the 
potential for conflict and misunderstanding that entailed.10 
Whatever the case, like the emerging country itself, the Islam lived 
by Indonesians expressed itself in multiple manifestations, influenced 
by both imported and locally-forged experience, including varieties of 
Middle Eastern reformism (notably turn-of-the-century modernist 
Islam), and indigenised mystical varieties soaked with Sufistic 
accommodations and selective borrowings. There were, as well, 
Javanese Christians ―a new phenomenon― and even “Javanese 
intellectuals who wrote works of literature saying that the Islamization 
of Java was a great mistake”.11 Many late nineteenth century observers, 
indeed, cast doubts on the reality of Islamic orthodoxy, especially in 
Java. The Dutch missionary Poensen, while admitting that “the people 
on the outside are very certainly Mohammedan,” thought that “in the 
depths of the soul there still works a religious life that expresses itself 
in all kinds of non-Mohammedan ideas and forms.”12 Another 
observer noted that though “the native people profess Islam ... most of 
them are not Mohammedans in the real sense, far from that.  The 
Javan, the ordinary villager, is much more attached to making offerings 
for various spirits than to the prescriptions of the Koran, which he 
very seldom observes, indeed he often pokes fun at the santri who 
does this.”13  
That “thin and flaking glaze” conception of Indonesian Islam, 
sometimes put to encourage the prospects for Christian missionising, 
was staunchly rejected by others.  Cipto Mangunkusumo, Dutch-
educated medico, intellectual, and free spirit, remarked that “our 
                                                 
10 Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society, pp. 95, 103-04.  
11 Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis, p. 231.  For more detailed discussions, see also Ricklefs, 
Polarising Javanese Society, pp. 46, 175, 177, 181-82, 212. 
12 C. Poensen, Brieven over den Islam uit de Binnenlanden van Java (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1886), 
p. 6 [1883]. 
13 Boeka [P.C.C. Hansen Jr], “De Inlander, Een Studie,” De Indische Gids 25 (1903), p. 
1137. 
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fathers and forefather have believed in that religion for centuries, 
whether they understood it or not, with their lips and with their hearts 
―that says it all .... The fact that we are ‘syncretists’ ... changes nothing: 
we go about our business in the holy understanding that we are 
Muslims!”14 Famed Dutch Islamologist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, 
in speaking of Java’s Princely Territories, acknowledged that “what 
[the mass of the population] possess in religious and other beliefs 
indeed goes by the name ‘Islam’, but actually consists in a mixture of 
Indonesian, Hindi and Chinese elements.”15  Nonetheless, thought 
Snouck, “this does not take away the fact that chiefs and people there 
are mostly very attached to Islam, that they see in it a palladium of 
their nationality, which becomes all the more dear to them according 
to the measure that it is exposed to attacks from outside.”16 Nor, 
Snouck noted elsewhere, was that behaviour exceptional; “one comes 
across such a compromise between the earlier and the later 
civilisational situation in all Mohammedan lands, including in the stem 
land of Arabia.”17 Only “superficial observers”, he asserted, might be 
moved to wonder how truly Muslim the Javanese were.18 In his 
analysis of West Sumatra, Van Ronkel opposed the notion of the 
“half-heather, half-Muslim Malay”; “all without exception want to be 
nothing other than Muslims.”19 
Reformist, then Modernist Islam 
The most significant new force in the Islamic variety displayed in 
Indonesia was sourced half a world away in the Middle East, where 
Islam had been gripped by renewal.  Those reformist waves sought 
more authentic expressions of Islam ―involving “sharply articulated 
                                                 
14 Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo, “Dr. Kuyper te laat,” Het Tijdschrift 2 (1912), p. 574. 
15 “Snouck to Directeur of Education, Worship and Industry, 21 March 1892,” in 
Gobée and Adriaanse (eds), Ambtelijke Adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje 1889-1936 (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957-65), vol. 2, p. 1077. 
16 “Snouck to Director van of Education, Worship and Industry, 16 October 1894,” in 
Gobée and Adriaanse (eds), Ambtelijke Adviezen, vol. 2, p. 1080. 
17 “Snouck to Minister of Colonies, 28 October 1910,” in Gobée and Adriaanse (eds), 
Ambtelijke Adviezen, vol. 2, p. 1099. 
18 C. Snouck Hurgronje, “Over Panislamisme” [1912], in A.J. Wensinck (ed.), Verspreide 
Geschriften van C. Snouck Hurgronje, vol. 1 (Bonn: Kurt Schoeder, 1923), p. 375. 
19 Ph.S. van Ronkel, Rapport Betreffende de Godsdienstige Verschijnselen ter Sumatra’s Westkust 
(Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1916), p. 14. 
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visions of the self-sufficiency of scripture and the moral responsibility 
of the individual”20― which might dispense with the thick crust of 
human accretions on religious belief and practice and return a more 
firmly grounded, intellectualised reliance on the original sources of 
Muslim tradition. Reformist, though not modernist, tendencies were 
typified in people like Ahmad Khatib, the Minangkabau madhhab 
scholar who left for Mecca in 1876 never to return. His thinking, best 
known through his fundamental criticism of the Minangkabau custom 
of matrilineal inheritance as contradicting the law of God and his 
opposition to Minangkabau mystical t }ari >qah orders,21 was propagated 
through his pupils returning home and the strong links he maintained 
with them.22 
Reformism’s modernist turn involved a deep aversion to 
misguided human innovation (bid`ah), but its privileging of the exercise 
of human rationality exhibited a new confidence in human capacity to 
interpret old traditions in ways that took better account of and sought 
to benefit from the reality of modernity. Such sentiments, propagated 
by such major figures as Jama>l al-Di>n al-Afgha>ni > and Muh}ammad 
`Abduh, began to lap upon the island shores of the Indies at the very 
end of the nineteenth century, partly in consequence of technological 
advances such as cheap printing and steamships.23 They expressed 
themselves institutionally in the early years of the twentieth century in 
efforts at religious regeneration and the introduction of modern ways 
of knowing and learning.  The champions of these tendencies saw 
themselves as a kaum muda (young group) of Muslim devotees, to be 
                                                 
20 John R. Bowen, Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 22. 
21 See “Snouck to Director of Education, Worship and Industry, 29 September 1894,” 
in Gobée and Adriaanse (eds), Ambtelijke Adviezen, vol. 3, pp. 1846-48; Murni Djamal, 
“The Origin of the Islamic Reform Movement in Minangkabau: Life and Thought of 
Abdul Karim Amrullah,” Studia Islamika 5, 3 (1998), p. 6. 
22 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 31-32; Djamal, “The origin”, p. 6; Taufik 
Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra  (1927-1933) 
(Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971), pp. 7-8. 
23 Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk, “A Sudanese Scholar in the Diaspora: Life and Career 
of Ahmad Muhamad al-Surkitti in Indonesia (1911-1943),” Studia Islamika 8, 1 (2001), 
p. 59  
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contrasted with the old group (kaum tua), still tied to traditional Islamic 
practices and techniques.24 
Just after the turn of the century, Indonesian Arabs formed a 
modern organisation, the Jamiat Khair (The Benevolent Society), 
which aimed at keeping pace with the rate of modern change especially 
through modern, Westernised education, which included religious 
education.25  A reformist segment of that society created the al-Irsyad 
education movement in 1913.26  The Muslim scholar Ahmad Dahlan, 
himself a former student of Khatib in Mecca,27 and profoundly 
influenced by the thinking of ‘Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida, 
formed the Yogyakarta-based modernist Muhammadiyah movement in 
1912; it focussed on meeting deeply-felt indigenous educational and 
social needs and on selfless, rational piety as the means for Muslim 
salvation.28  Muhammadiyah, on a sound footing in Java by the early 
1920s, was imported to Minangkabau in 1925 by the 
uncompromisingly aggressive Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah (Haji 
Rasul). That Minang connection was to prove central to 
Muhammadiyah’s larger elaboration, and the organisation spread 
quickly into other regions outside Java thereafter.29 
Notwithstanding its internal divisions and the varieties of its 
manifestation, then, Islam dominated the terrain of Indonesian 
ideology and thinking about identity at the turn of the twentieth 
century. But it remained remote from the levers that guided the flow 
of political events, a result of the confluence of three factors: a 
                                                 
24 Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 6. 
25 Ibid., pp. 58, 92; Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening: Community and 
Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942 (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 
1999), p. 36-37; “Adjunct Advisor for Native affairs [Rinkes] to Governor-General, 13 
May 1913,” in S.L. van der Wal (ed.), De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in 
Nederlandsche-Indie (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1967), p. 202.  See also Mobini-Kesheh, 
The Hadrami Awakening, p. 37 
26 Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, pp. 62-63. 
27 A. Jainuri, Muhammadiyah: Gerakan Reformasi Islam di Jawa pada Awal abad Kedua Puluh 
(Surabaya: PT Bina Ilmu, 1981), p. 25. 
28 Fauzan Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century Indonesia: A 
Critical Study (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 120-21; Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: 
Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 137. 
29 Jainuri, Muhammadiyah, p. 42; Bowen, Muslims through Discourse, p. 56. 
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reticence about nation, new, vital and competing cultural imaginings, 
and its own belated politicking. 
Muslim Diffidence about Nation 
Indigenous identity sometimes expressed itself in local terms, 
sometimes more broadly in ethnic terms (Javanese, Balinese, Acehnese, 
for example), and most of all in terms of religion, that is, in a shared 
sense of Muslim-ness that transcended any privileged attachment to a 
specific place.30 Islamic thinking, however, remained essentially a 
function of self-regarding pious thought, directed more towards 
individual and social behaviour and ritual than to political architecture.  
Within the realm of specifically Muslim thinking ―of whatever stripe― 
notions of territorial belonging or attachment were hardly in evidence. 
Outside that realm, though, the new world of the Indies was 
beginning to loom large, with the confused and confusing experience 
of epochal change ―we call it modernity― impressing itself on the 
minds of the few.  As Cipto remarked, “Without any doubt, the 
present day Indies is passing through a particularly pregnant period of 
evolution”.31 That sense expressed itself in an entirely new conception 
of belonging; community no longer meant only attachment a specific 
village, town, city or even ethnic territory, nor to a broad religious 
solidarity. Now, with the creation of the Netherlands Indies, it 
involved a consciousness of the new togetherness of nation. The 
linking of modernity with the sense of the need for urgent reform and 
an expanded understanding of political place brought the developing 
realisation that the essential vehicle through which the problems of 
modernity might be solved was the nation.  That was to have serious 
implications for those of a seriously Muslim bent, because Islamic 
expressions of consciousness, even the reforming consciousness of the 
kaum muda, were slow to frame their thinking in terms of a politico-
territorial community.  Some, like Ahmad Ripangi in mid-nineteenth 
century Java, asserted their religious authority in opposition to the 
operations and policies of an infidel government.32 Others, a little later, 
expressed deep regret that local Muslim disunity had allowed infidel 
                                                 
30 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 99. 
31 Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo, “Geestelijke immobiliteit geeischt,” Het Tijdschrift 1 (1912), 
p. 17. 
32 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 32. 
 
 
 
 
239 
Islam and the Early Indonesian Nationalist Movement 
239 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 01, Number 02, December 2007 
conquest in the first place.33 But it was panislamism, not territorial 
assertiveness, that remained the focus of Muslim concern, just as it was 
that of an increasingly suspicious colonial government.34 
Islam as religion has not often attached itself to notions of place 
with the religious fixity that has come to underline modern national 
sensibility. But Indies Muslims were not entirely unconscious of 
homeland.  The Ja>wa> communities maintained in Mecca and Cairo by 
the large and rapidly growing number of pilgrims, disjointed and riven 
as they were, had a strong sense of Malayo-Muslim identity but, as 
Laffan remarks, they expressed their “sense of imagined community 
above all else as a function of Islam”.35 When they began to join place 
and religion, the latter was always dominant.   Slowly, very slowly, the 
sense of place began to take sharper focus, partly through a developing 
network of print built upon long traditions of scholarly contact 
between Southeast Asian students of Islam and the Middle East itself, 
which took its inspiration from an increasingly restive, politically 
charged and relatively free religious centre in Cairo, itself increasingly 
conscious of attachment to homeland (wat }an).36 
In that context the Singapore Ja >wi>-script journal al-Ima >m (1906-08), 
“the first channel of Cairene discourse in the bila>d al-ja>wa>,”37 containing 
“with the first really serious presentation of the Modernist analysis of 
social, religious and economic issues,”38 began publication under the 
leadership of Shaykh Muh}ammad T{a >hir bin Jala >l al-Di>n al-
Minangkaba>wi> al-Azhari > from Bukittingi. Derivative of the Egyptian al-
Mana>r, itself under the editorial hand of Rid }a>, al-Ima>m spoke in vague 
terms of the identity created by the Malay homelands, but without any 
closer national specificity, and of the Muslim need to progress in tune 
with modernity’s demands.39   
                                                 
33 The Sumatran, Ahmad Lampung, paraphrased by Snouck in Laffan, Islamic 
Nationhood, p. 67. 
34 Snouck, “Over Panislamisme,” p. 366; Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 126. 
35 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 2. 
36 Ibid., pp. 10, 20, 129, 131, 133. 
37 Ibid., p. 148. 
38 M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), p. 214. 
39 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 153; Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 34; 
Azyumardi Azra, “The Transmission of al-Manar’s Reformism to the Malay-
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But Indonesian Islam’s slowly formulating sense of territoriality 
was already hopelessly behind the game.  Around the same time, the 
popular journal Bintang Hindia had espoused the Netherlands Indies as 
its special identifying place, Japan’s victory over Russia, underlining 
notions of national or even racial solidarity rather than religious 
community, had sounded “the new period for the whole East”,40 and 
within a few years E.F.E. Douwes Dekker and his colleagues in the 
Indische Partij (IP)(1912) would drive the idea of the nexus of nation 
and modernity to its logical conclusion:  there is an Indies, we are its 
citizens, and we demand proprietorial control from the foreign 
government that currently controls it; “we need here a revolution …. 
Revolution means THE INDIES STOPS BEING A COLONY AND 
BECOMES A STATE.”41  The only basis for unity amongst so diverse 
a collection of peoples was the nation itself; indeed, “social unity is ...  
only possible where political equality exists among the uniting parts.”42 
Religion, then, was peripheral to IP’s main concerns and its attitude to 
religion disinterested; its only religious task, claimed Douwes Dekker, 
was “to struggle against every expression of sectarianism, to oppose 
every attempt to nurture religious hatred, and to preach the religion of 
brotherliness.”43 
While place was important for devout Muslims, it was certainly not 
the all-consuming entity it was for Douwes Dekker and his fellows. If 
there was, as Laffan claims, a sense that already “the ultimate goal was 
the independence (Ar. Istiqla>l) of their various lands (tanah),”44 it was 
born of a certain frustration that these Muslim lands were under the 
sway of Dutch and British. “Does all this not make one’s heart heavy 
                                                                                                      
Indonesian World: The cases of al-Imam and al-Munir,” Studia Islamika 6, 3 (1999), pp. 
79-84, 87, 91. 
40 Noto Soeroto, “De Eendracht van Indië en Nederland,” Indische Vereeniging: 
Voordrachten en Mededeelingen 5 (1913), p. 3-4. 
41 Quoted in Anon. [D.A. Rinkes], Bescheiden Betreffende de Vereeninging “De Indiche Partij” 
(Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1913), p. 1. 
42 E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, Aansluiting Tusschen Blank en Bruin.  Rede, Uitgesprokendoor den 
heer E.F.E. Douwes Dekker in een Openbare Bijeenkomst, Gehouden te Batavia op 12 December 
1911 (Batavia: G. Kolff, 1912), p. 13. 
43 E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, De Indische Partij: Haar Wezen en haar Doel (Bandung: 
Fortuna, 1913), p. 25. 
44 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 157. 
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or indeed wound it?,”45 remarked al-Ima>m in 1906, with the strong 
implication that loss of territory to these powers was a function of 
religious negligence. In that sense, as Noer notes, “in the political field, 
the ideas from the Middle East among the reformists in Indonesia 
were less influential than those in the basically religious arena.”46 
That message was continued by al-Ima>m’s successor publication, al-
Muni >r (1911-16), “the first Modernist journal in Indonesia”,47 a Ja>wi> 
fortnightly published in Padang by the Minangkabau reformist Haji 
Abdullah Ahmad.48 Its masthead contained the motto “For the 
advancement of Islam, knowledge and news”.49 “We plan”, it 
proclaimed, “to establish true Islam among the people of our people 
(bangsa) … and to show them the way to the field of advancement and 
the life of the world which will bring us perfection in the next life … 
[We aim to bring our people] to the field of love for the homeland and 
its people … and the way of love for the community.”50 That bangsa 
was in the first instance the Minangkabau homeland, an understanding 
that gradually expanded to include all of the Muslim inhabitants of the 
Indies.51 There was, however, no sense of opposition to Dutch rule, 
generally seen as sound, efficient and protective of Muslim interests 
nor, indeed, any sense that the journal prescribed any kind of political 
activism.52  
A more specific engagement with territoriality had to await the 
emergence, then maturity, of the great Java-based mass organisation, 
Sarekat Islam (SI). In 1916 ―the year of SI’s first “national congress” 
(so designated because, SI’s leader Cokroaminoto declared, “the 
popular movement is striving for the formation of a strong unity for all 
                                                 
45 Al-Ima>m, vol. 1, no. 3, 19 September 1906, quoted in Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 
158. 
46 Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 299. 
47 Ricklefs, A History, p. 214. 
48 Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 39; Azra, “The transmission,” pp. 92-93. 
49 “Adjunct Advisor for Native Affairs (Rinkes) to GG, 19 February 1912,” in Van der 
Wal (ed.), De Opkomst, p. 76. 
50 Al-Muni>r 1, 1 (1 April 1911), quoted in Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 174. 
51 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, pp. 174-75, 178, 234. 
52 Azra, “The transmission,” p. 96.  
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the people of the Indies Archipelago”)53― al-Muni >r’s manager, together 
with Cokroaminoto, founded an al-Islamiyah Association which 
produced a Ja >wi>-script journal Al-Isla>m, an “organ for Indies-Muslim 
nationalists”,54 as its subtitle proclaimed, which explicitly perceived of 
the nation as “the Muslim people of the Indies”.55 
Despite these developments, however, the reformists were still far 
from centring their attention and core sense of identity on local place; 
for them it remained at the periphery in a world centred on the Middle 
East. They saw their task, accordingly, in a typically missionary sense 
which tended to denigrate the local as derivative and insubstantial, and 
its improvement as a matter of more assiduous piety, of re-engineering 
religious belief and practice in such a way that Muslims might no 
longer suffer the humbling subordination that their religious laxity had 
visited upon them in the first place. 
New Modes of Thinking about Modernity 
While devout Muslims focussed on the demands of reviving and 
revitalising their faith, entirely new strains of thinking which gave little 
space to purely Islamic thought were grasping at other Indonesians’ 
minds. The bureaucratic requirements of the developing Dutch 
colonial state meant that those members of the indigenous elite drawn 
into Dutch service needed to blend their lifestyles to accord better with 
Dutch expectations. That included a wariness, and occasionally a 
fearful paranoia, about the political effects of a more pious, sometimes 
more militant, profession of Islam, and a general diminution in the 
importance of Islamic attachment in their lives.56  Those in 
government service, remarked Snouck, “need to know that any form 
of panislamism is inconsistent with a proper sense of their role or their 
service”.57 As Ricklefs remarks, “Only the [form of modernity brought 
                                                 
53 Paraphrased in J.Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-
Indie (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1987 [1931]), p. 63. 
54 Extract in Anon., Sarekat-Islam Congres (1e nationaal congres) 17-24 Juni 1916 te Bandoeng. 
(behoort bij de Geheime  Missive van den wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken dd. 29 September 
1916 No. 226 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1916), p. 62. 
55 Al-Isla>m, 15 June 1916, quoted in Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 179. 
56 “Snouck to Director of Education, Worship and Industry, 29 September 1894,” in 
Gobée and Adriaanse (eds), Ambtelijke Adviezen, vol. 3, p. 1991.  
57 C. Snouck Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam, 2de vermeerde druk (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1915), p. 69. 
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by Europeans] offered them also employment, salaries, status and 
security.”58 Moreover, the indigenous bureaucratic elite had no interest 
in admitting new competition to their positions of leadership,59 sensing 
the threat presented by the emergence of a middle class of “traders, 
tradesmen, supervisors ... who continually come to the foreground and 
take an autonomous position over against the priyayi.”60 Accordingly, 
Snouck could remark that “the Javanese aristocracy … as a rule is not 
strongly Islamic”,61 and note its “religious tolerance bordering on 
indifference.”62 
The Dutch provided a solidly Western education for their 
modernising indigenous officials ―secular, modern, and embossed 
with a strong sense of the superiority of Western civilisation and the 
consequent need for stabilising social hierarchy. This new knowledge, 
the key to indigenous bureaucratic success, gave them a strong stake in 
that Westernised world and its continued success; “in our Indonesia”, 
remarked a reminiscing nationalist, “people at the beginning of this 
century were busy putting out their hands for Western development.” 
63 The rise of print in the last decades of the nineteenth century as a 
medium for the spreading and exchange of information and ideas 
evoked a cosmopolitanism which itself stimulated elite intellectual 
curiosity.64  Thus, for the musicologist and Theosophist Suryoputro, 
“the Javanese have taken on the ideal of developing themselves under 
the guidance of Dutch intellect.”65 Achmad Jayadiningrat, educated in 
                                                 
58 Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society, p. 127. 
59 Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 209.  Noer adds that “in this connection 
they found ready support from traditionalist ulama … whose position was also shaken 
because of the spread of reformist ideas”. 
60 M. Lindenborn [Director, Netherlands Missionary Association], Zendingslicht op den 
Islam (Den Haag: Den Boekhandel van den Zendingstudie Raad, 1918), p. 141. 
61 “Snouck to Governor-General, 19 April 1904,” in Gobée and Adriaanse (eds), 
Ambtelijke Adviezen, vol. 1, p. 673 (emphasis in original). 
62  Snouck Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam, p. 87-88. 
63 Anon., “Terugblik,” in Anon. (ed.), Gedenkboek 1908-1923 Indonesische Vereeniging 
(n.p.: n.p., n.d [1924]), p. 3. 
64 Ahmat B. Adam, The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian 
Consciousness (1855-1913) (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1995), p. 
36. 
65 Paraphrased in Anon., “Algemeene vergadering op den 22ste Mei 1915,” Indische 
Vereeniging. Voordrachten en Mededeelingen 10 (1916), p. 54. 
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both Western and Islamic traditions but choosing the Western one 
with subsequent great success, was a manifestation of the way in which 
Westernisation, increasingly concerned at what it saw as the 
immobilising and politically dangerous tendencies of the Islam 
propagated in the Indies,66 captured its targets and turned them into 
humane, cosmopolitan, loyal (though often still Muslim), servants of 
the status quo.67 
That sense of distance from any intimate connection with Islam 
and a corresponding attachment to modern Western thinking was 
exemplified in the thinking of Raden Ajeng Kartini. She called herself 
“a child of Buddha”,68 and claimed ignorance of Islam; “in truth, I am 
a Moslem only because my ancestors were. How can I love a doctrine 
which I do not know—may never know?”69 She thought polygamy “an 
evil of gigantic proportions ... under the protection of Mohammedan 
teaching.”70 More broadly: 
“We have for a long time turned our backs totally against 
religion because we see so much lovelessness under the 
banner of religion …. The most beautiful and the most 
elevated religion we think is: Love.  And does one 
absolutely have to be a Christian to be able to live 
according to that divine commandment?  The Buddhist, 
the Brahmin, the Jew, the Mohammedan, even the 
Heathen, can also live a life of love”.71 
Kartini exhibited a kind of open, cultured, faintly liberal humanism 
rather than any specific attachment to Islamic belief or devotion nor, 
indeed, any religion as such.  Thus, she wrote, “true culture lies not in 
the colour of the skin, not in the clothes, not in the outward 
                                                 
66 See Snouck, “Over Panislamisme,” pp. 378-79. 
67 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, pp. 91, 94; Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society, pp. 151-53. 
68 “Letter to Mrs Abendanon, 27 October 1902,” in Joost Coté (trans.), Letters from 
Kartini: An Indonesian Feminist, 1900-1914 (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute in association 
with Hyland House, 1992), p. 319. 
69 “Kartini to Stella Zeehandelaar, 6 November 1899,” in Hildred Geertz (ed.), Letters 
of a Javanese Princess: Raden Adjeng Kartini (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1964), 
p. 44. 
70 “Letter to Mrs Abendanon, August 1900,” in Coté (trans.), Letters from Kartini, p. 26. 
71 “Letter to Mrs Abendanon, 27 December 1902,” in Coté (trans.), Letters from Kartini, 
p. 346. 
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behaviour, not in the language of the speaker, nor in the name of the 
religion one confesses. True culture resides in the heart. It is a matter 
of character and nobility of the soul.”72 
Such emerging styles of thought gave birth of Budi Utomo (1908), 
an association which sought, under the inspiration of the modernising 
journalist Wahidin Sudirohusodo, to refashion Javanese society by 
combining the best of the (Western) new with (timeless, great, thus 
pre-Islamic) Javanese culture, itself busily being rediscovered and 
foregrounded by Dutch scholarship and to create a new sense of 
identity amongst those broadly construed as belonging to the Javanese 
cultural heritage. “For the Javanese elite”, notes Ricklefs, “European-
style modernity was a means of embracing pre-Islamic culture”,73 itself, 
indeed, a spiritual and intellectual option to revivalist Islam.74 The 
power of these new styles of thinking and their relation to notions of 
modernity and progressivity was reflected in the attachment of some 
members of the aristocratic elite to such currents as Freemasonry and 
Theosophy. While Freemasonry held little general appeal for 
Indonesians, Theosophy, with a similar hankering for a kind of 
synthesised, harmonious human brotherliness that superseded 
divisions of race and religion, proved rather more attractive to many 
Javanese aristocrats.  One-third of the total membership of the 
Theosophical Society in the Indies in 1913 comprised “natives”, 
including members of Javanese royal blood;75 embers also included the 
Surakarta court physician, Javanese culturalist, and influential BU 
leader Rajiman, as well as senior SI leaders and Cipto Mangunkusumo. 
Indies society was, then, increasingly deeply divided by two 
separate but interconnected ideological fault lines. On the one hand 
were the Islamic modernists, the kaum muda, often the products of a 
Middle Eastern education, spreading their reforming and emancipating 
religious ideas, over against the traditionalist kaum tua, tied to 
precedent and tradition, distrustful that change might unbalance 
society’s harmony and enmeshed in cultural constructions of 
                                                 
72 “Give the Javanese education!,” in Coté (trans.), Letters from Kartini, p. 541. 
73 Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society, p. 149. 
74 Ibid., pp. 177, 219. 
75 Herman Arij Oscar de Tollenaere, The Politics of Divine Wisdom: Theosophy and Labour, 
National, and Womens’ Movements in Indonesia and South Asia, 1875-1947 (Nijmegen: 
Uitgeverij Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 1996), p. 107. 
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indigenous identity. On the other was the Islamic tradition per se, 
either modernist or traditionalist, over against a newly emergent 
secularising tendency which, while often retaining its cultural 
attachment to Islam, was not ruled by it, was often critical of what it 
saw as Islam’s constraining, conserving tendencies, and sometimes 
wanted to forget the “Mohammedan” period in Javanese cultural 
history”;76 it stretched out to capture and master the new knowledge 
now increasingly available from the West and to put it at its service. 
Its critique of Islam was often expressed in terms of the heights 
Java had reached in the pre-Islamic period, “the high civilisation ... the 
high level of industry and art in the pre-Islamic period.”77 For Cipto, 
the Hindu-Javanese Majapahit era was “the period in our history which 
lives on in our memory as the golden age of our people”, notable for 
“the already existing tolerance of the Javanese in the arena of belief”. 
The subsequent decline he attributed to the meeting of an aging 
religion ―Islam― with a declining civilisation.78 Rajiman spoke of “the 
glorious period of Majapahit”, upon which the “invasion of the 
Mohammedan religion” had exercised a culturally debilitating effect.79  
Cipto’s brother Gunawan thought that “in many respects the 
Mohammedan religion displays so little obligingness (inschikkelijkheid) 
that it ... is inimical to our character.”  “The Koran is our holy book, 
we believe in it”, he asserted but, he asked, “do we love it?  Do we 
cherish it in our heart as we do Javanese books, which tell us of 
Majapahit’s greatness?” Indeed, “our popular entertainment par 
excellence, the wayang, is an abomination for the true Islamite”, and 
“no matter how high the cultural value of Islam may be, it can not 
reach the heart of the people.” In the end Gunawan feared the capacity 
of religion to divide, and that it stood in the way of his country’s 
                                                 
76 See “Nota over Het Congres voor Javaanse Cultuurontwikkeling van B.J.O Schrieke, 
27 juli 1918,” in R.C. Kwantes (ed.), De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in 
Nederlandsch-Indië vol. 1 (Groningen: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1975), p. 66. 
77 “Darmo Kondo 6 November 1918,” in Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche 
Pers [IPO] 45/1918. 
78 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Iets Over den Javaan, Zijn Geschiedenis en Zijn Ethiek 
(Semarang: n.p., 1913), pp. 5, 6, 11. 
79 Radjiman, “De Maatschappelijke Loop van de Javaansche (Indonesische) 
Bevolking,” Indisch Genootschap: vergadering van 27 February 1920, pp. 64, 66; Radjiman, 
“Het Psychisch Leven van Het Javaansch Volk,” Indisch Genootschap: Algemeene 
Vergadering van 14 February 1911, p. 154. 
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resurrection should it be employed as a political weapon.80 The 
Javanese nationalist Suriokusumo thought that “religion as a means of 
unity is finished.  Islam can not tie us to the Sumatran, much less to 
the Ambonese or Menadonese who are not Muslims.  Religion as a 
means of unity is very unwise if not dangerous.”81 An Indonesian 
writer took the Prophet to task for his “actions against the Jews and 
his attitude towards his women.”82  The Javanese elitist Satiman 
Wiryosanjoyo was rather more direct: he saw religious zealotry as 
inimical to national development, and the pilgrimage as a waste of 
money.83 
Belated Islamism 
The territorial agnosticism exhibited by Muslim leaders ignored the 
political implications of the gathering, consolidating unity of the 
Netherlands Indies. As we have seen, by the early years of the 
twentieth century some indigenous intellectuals had began to express a 
sense of Indies identity, of being part of the new state of the Indies, 
based on a specific sense of territory and with no particular attachment 
to Islamic thinking.  Bintang Hindia spoke of a bangsa Hindia (Indies 
nation) that needed reform and renovation, and exemplified the notion 
that the key to advancement was modern knowledge.84 Its masthead 
proclaimed “May the kingdom of the Netherlands endure forever, may 
the land of the Indies (tanah Hindia) be famous.” Its editor, Abdul 
Rivai, spoke of a time when the native people of Java “would turn 
their face in prayer no longer to the ka’bah but to The Hague.”85 
                                                 
80 Goenawan Mangoenkoesoemo, “Ons Standpunt Tegenover den Godsdienst,” in 
Anon., Soembangsih: Gedenkboek Boedi-Oetomo: 1908-20 Mei-1918 (Amsterdam: Tijdschrift 
Nederl. Indië Oud & Nieuw, 1918), pp. 106, 107, 109, 111. 
81 R.M.S. Soeriokoesoemo, “Javaansch Nationalisme,” in R.M.S. Soeriokoesoemo, A 
Muhlenfeld, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, and J.B. Wens, Javaansche of Indisch 
Nationalisme? Pro en Contra (Semarang: Semarang Drukkerij en Boekhandel H.A. 
Benjamins, 1918), p. 3-4. 
82 De Expres 19 February 1913, quoted in Anon., Vervolg der Nota I, Betreffende de 
Geschriften van Douwes Dekker (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1913), p. 23. 
83 Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging, p. 198.   
84 Adam, The Vernacular Press, p. 105; Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 99. 
85 Quoted in Harry A. Poeze, “Early Indonesian emancipation: Abdul Rivai, Van 
Heutsz, and the Bintang Hindia,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 145 (1989), 
p. 91. 
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Douwes Dekker’s IP concretised and gave intellectual substance 
sentiments of that kind. 
Islam did provide the bases of the first mass political movement in 
the Indies, SI, but it was a diffuse and shifting foundation. Broad-
based but locally-rooted, with a vague egalitarianism which stood in 
opposition to demeaning aristocratic hierarchy, SI was a “great folk 
movement which linked Islamic revival with anti-colonialism.”86 It 
was, in the words of Governor-General Idenburg, “an expression of 
what can be called the Native becoming self-conscious.”87  It sought 
social and material welfare and mutual assistance, making an explicit 
claim for Muslim solidarity in pursuit of those goals, aiming at 
enhanced religious piety and observance, and devoting itself to the 
progress and emancipation of the native peoples.88 It operated as 
society’s sounding board, its crisis and grievance centre.  Islam, indeed, 
was SI’s identifying, communitarian motif, bringing together people of 
variously different understandings of Islam but ―notwithstanding an 
evident increase in piety, Islamised social behaviour, clubbish solidarity 
and assertiveness89― not just for specifically Islamic purposes. Sarekat 
Islam in its early great phase never gave specific prominence to Islamic 
thought or teaching;90 Suwardi Suryaningrat, scion of the house of 
                                                 
86 David E.F. Henley, Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context: Minahasa in the 
Dutch East Indies (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), pp. 84-85. 
87 “Governor-General to Minister of Colonies, 2 July 1913,” Archive of the Minster of 
Colonies [AMK], Exhibitum 31 July 1913/U22, Verbaal [V] 9 August 1913/B13, 
Nationaal Archief, The Hague [NADH]. 
88 See, for example, “Secret Nota Bupati Rembang to Resident Rembang, 13 April 
1913,” “Assistant-Resident Tangerang to Resident Batavia, 7 May 1913,” “Resident 
Surakarta to Governor-General, 24 May 1913,” in Sartono Kartodirdjo et al. (eds), 
Sarekat Islam Lokal (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1975), pp. 13, 190, 
339. 
89 “Adjunct Advisor for Native Affairs [Rinkes] to Governor-General, 13 May 1913,” 
“Advisor for Native Affairs [Rinkes] to Governor-General, 30 November 1915,” both 
in Van der Wal (ed.), De Opkomst, p. 201-02, 430; “Letter Official assisting Attorney-
General (Hoorweg) to Attorney General, 3 February 1919,” AMK, Mail report [MR] 
1358/1919, NADH; “Assistant Resident Meester-Cornelis to Resident Batavia, 26 July 
1914,” in Kartodirdjo et al. (eds), Sarekat Islam Lokal, p. 48. 
90 Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1969),  p. 174; Harry A. Poeze, “Inleiding,” in Harry A. Poeze (ed.), 
Politiek-politioneele overzichten van Nederlandsche-Indië vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1982), p. xxx. 
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Paku Alam, sought in 1913 to remove the requirement that SI 
members be Muslims because the real solidarity needing expression 
was that of the inhabitants of the Indies, a spatial rather than religious 
tie.91 
Although being Muslim was framed as the badge of indigeneity, SI 
originally had no overt political agenda. Cokroaminoto asserted in 
1912 that “according to the Sjari’ah of Islam, we must obey the 
command of the Dutch government, we must strictly and loyally 
follow the laws and regulations of the Dutch.”92 Nonetheless, SI’s 
astonishingly rapid growth and its size and weight necessitated, soon 
enough, that it engage in politics frontally. In doing so, however, it 
found itself inevitably drawn into nationalist politics, the framing of 
indigenous improvement in relation to enhanced political autonomy. 
As Suwardi pointed out, SI had decided “in future to accept not only 
religion but also and especially Indies nationalism as the bond of 
unity.”93 SI leader Abdul Muis remarked in 1917 that “the basis of our 
movement ... is nationalist.”94 SI embraced the idea of representational 
politics (“the administration of the Indies by its own people, without 
there being any discrimination on the basis of race, colour or 
religion”),95 as well as strains of socialism, even as it proclaimed that 
Islam was “the religion par excellence for the moral education of the 
people”.96 For the formidable SI intellectual, Haji Agus Salim, the 
connection between religion and politics remained one essentially of 
enhanced private behaviour for the social good. Cokroaminoto 
thought likewise: “Currently many bad usages and customs dominate 
amongst us, while we do not give enough of our attention to religious 
matters. We always feel ourselves of lesser worth and are convinced of 
                                                 
91 Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, p. 59. 
92 Oetoesan Hindia, 24 March 1912, quoted in Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, pp. 
111-12. 
93 Surya Ningrat [Suwardi Suryaningrat], “Het Javaansch nationalisme in de Indische 
beweging,” in Anon., Soembangsih, p. 33. 
94 Abdoel Moeis, “Hindia boeat anak Hindia” [1917], in Pitut Soeharto and A. Zainoel 
Ihsan (eds.), Permata Terbenam; Capita Selecta Keempat (Jakarta: Aksara Jayasakti, 1982), p. 
74. 
95 Paraphrased in Anon., Sarekat-Islam Congres (2e Nationaal Congres) 20-27 October 1917 te 
Batavia (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1919), p. 2. 
96 “Beginselverklaring en werkprogramma,” Bijlage IV of ibid., p. 103. 
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our weakness. This has to change, and it shall, if we truly know the 
teaching of our religion and carry it out.”97 
SI had become political, but not (yet) Islamist. In taking up the 
nationalist discourse, SI would face three great problems. The first was 
the blowtorch of increasing government opposition. The second was a 
test of its Muslim credentials.  The third was the enduring problem of 
maintaining the centrality of Islam in a multicultural/multireligious 
society. 
As government suspicion of SI’s political pretensions grew 
―fuelled by reports of SI-sponsored violence and intrigue― 
conservative members fell away. Many Hadramis, previously highly 
prominent in the organisation, but discouraged by growing leftism and 
reports of systematic corruption, and increasingly marginalised because 
of their lack of “nativeness”, took their leave,98 as did other “quiet, 
settled citizens of native society.”99 
A challenge from the developing Communist movement came in 
the form of a purely tactical move that aimed to capture SI and move 
in a more radical, politically purposeful direction. That stimulated a 
reaction, an effort by more self-consciously Islamic forces within SI, 
centred around Salim and the invigorated Yogyakarta branch of SI, to 
push the movement along more determinedly Muslim lines as a hedge 
against Communist influence spearheaded from Semarang.100 In this 
Muslim turn, the role of Salim, whose earlier experience as an 
employee at the Netherlands’ consulate in Jeddah (1906-11) had 
brought him religious revivification as well as a close relationship with 
                                                 
97 Paraphrased in “Meeting over den Mohammedaanschen godsdienst in het 
Sirenepark (Vrijdag 25 October 1917,” Bijlage VI of ibid., p. 115. 
98 Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, pp. 33, 46, 48, 50-51; “Snouck to 
Governor-General, 19 April 1904,” in Gobée and Adriaanse (eds), Ambtelijke Adviezen, 
vol. 1, p. 671. 
99 “Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand [1922],” AMK, MR 141*/1923, 
NADH. 
100 It is interesting that the Yogyakarta group included Suryopranoto, the famous 
“strike king” and leader of the sugar factory workers’ union, the Personeel Fabrieks 
Bond, who was not noted as a fierce champion of religion.  Indeed, a report of PFB 
congress of 1 January 1921 contained not a single direct mention of religion, let alone 
Islam, and the aims of the PFB included no mention of religion (“Congres P.F.B. 
gehouden ten huize van Karijoredjo, Toego koelon, op den 31 Dec. 1920 and 1 Januari 
1921,” AMK, MR 360*/1921, NADH; “Wd Aviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (R.Kern) 
to Governor-General, 22 September 1920,” AMK, MR1248*/1920, NADH). 
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‘Abduhist thinking,101 became ever more important, and 
Cokroaminoto’s ever more that of figurehead. Salim, with his 
knowledge of Arabic and his Middle Eastern experience, enjoyed much 
greater authority in his Islamic discourse than did Cokroaminoto, 
whose Islam was partly learned from English-language books since he 
knew little Arabic.102 It was, in the end, Salim “who gave an Islamic 
stamp to the political character of the Sarekat Islam”.103 It was now 
becoming clear that Islam, under Salim’s guiding hand, was to be the 
driver of SI’s policy and politics in a way that had never been evident 
before.104  That position had the virtue of excluding communists 
(achieved by virtue of the imposition of party discipline in 1921), 
emphasising Islam as the bond of all Indonesians, and containing the 
essential elements, economic, social, and spiritual, for Indonesia’s 
uplift.105 
Salim was the first Muslim politician who attempted explicitly and 
systematically to relate his Islam (“Islam provides a perfect compass 
and road-map for humanity for its life in the world”)106 to the political 
problems facing his country and people.  It was he who “brought the 
colour of Islam to SI”.107 Hitherto, Islamic thinking had generally been 
of a single-dimensional quality, the process of determining how 
specific issues might be understood ―better, adjudicated― from an 
Islamic perspective. Salim sought to develop from Islam a political 
                                                 
101 De Tollenaere, The Politics of Divine Wisdom, p. 165; Erni Haryanti Kahfi, “Haji Agus 
Salim: His Role in Nationalist Movements in Indonesia during the Early Twentieth 
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105 See Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1965), p. 100. 
106 Dunia Islam, 23 March 1923, in Panitia Peringatan Hadji A. Salim Genap Berusia 70 
Tahun [Mohamad Roem et al.], Djedjak Langkah Hadji A. Salim: Pilihan Karangan, 
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approach of a general kind.108 For him, “there is no need to look for 
other ‘isms’ to treat the sickness of the movement.  The medicine is in 
the foundation itself, a foundation which is ancient and enduring ... 
that foundation is Islam.”109 Thus, the basic principles he drafted for 
SI included the conviction that “genuine freedom for the people of the 
Indies, that is, what will really release all the people from every kind of 
subjection, is by means of the road to freedom based upon Islam.”110 
For Salim, “all virtues of the other principles can be found in Islam 
while all defects, faults and evils of the other principles are absent in 
Islam.”111 
That intellectual trajectory had its natural conclusion in the holding 
of the first Al-Islam congress in Cirebon late in 1922 which marked 
Cokroaminoto’s move from leading a catholic movement of progress 
and protest to a more narrowly confined emphasis on Islam and the 
unity which Islam brought.112 Cokroaminoto himself, as well as 
focussing on Islamic morality ―“the necessity that Islam become a 
living force in people, so that they become better people inside”113― 
began further to develop his thinking on the relationship of Islam to 
socialism.114 That thinking sought to find in the Qur’a >n principles of 
equality and brotherhood, as well as opposition to the rapacity of 
capitalism.115 Around the same time came the slowly gestated 
emergence of the Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI),116 an organisational 
overhaul of SI that formally recognised the reality and centrality of 
contestation for the territory of the Indies (now increasingly called 
                                                 
108 Th. Sumartana, Mission at the Crossroads: Indigenous Churches, European Missionaries, 
Islamic Association and Socio-religious Change in Java 1812-1936 (Jakarta: BPK Gunung 
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109 Neratja, 18 October 1921, quoted in Suradi, Haji Agus Salim, p. 42. 
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112 Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, p. 237. 
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Indonesia) and at the same time a vehicle of panislamic pretensions 
(even is these were essentially directed towards domestic purposes of 
Islamic solidarity-making).117 PSI sought to represent in a more 
disciplined and controlled way devout Muslim political interests rather 
than, as SI had done, bridging a multiplicity of interests. 
Many SI members were dismayed at SI’s conversion into a deeply 
religiously-grounded political organisation.118 One East Java member 
thought that “as soon as politics and religion separate from each other, 
the SI shall undoubtedly progress and unity can quickly be 
organised.”119 Kaum tua supporters saw themselves increasingly 
marginalised and exposed and sought to improve their status by 
establishing a rival association in 1926, traditionalist in orientation but 
modern in its methods and pragmatically flexible in its political 
practice.120 Even Muhammadiyah found itself a victim of PSI party 
discipline, something caused by Muhammadiyah’s view that “those 
who use religion for political purposes are infidels”121 as well as its 
developing competition with PSI,122 and reflecting Muhammadiyah’s 
disdain for PSI’s increasingly isolationist and combative approach.  
Other critics, especially Communists, saw the defining Islamist turn as 
a rejection and a retreat from the task of opposition and confrontation; 
“in the practical politics of the far left wing Islam plays no role.”123   
                                                 
117 “Politiek Politioneel Overzicht [PPO] March 1927,” in Poeze (ed.), Politiek-
politioneele Overzichten, p. 24.  See also “Snouck to Minister of Colonies, 2 February 
1926,” in Gobée and Adriaanse (eds), Ambtelijke Adviezen, vol. 2, p. 1716; Suradi, Haji 
Agus Salim, p. 41. 
118 McVey, The rise of Indonesian Communism, pp. 166-67. 
119 Kemadjoean Hindia, 5-11 December 1925, IPO 51/1925.  For comments of a 
similarly critical kind, see also PPO June 1927, PPO November 1927, PPO December 
1927, all in Poeze (ed.), Politiek-politioneele Overzichten, pp. 68, 174, 197. 
120 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 235; Giora Eliraz, “The Islamic Reformist Movement 
in the Malay-Indonesian World in the First Four Decades of the 20th Century: Insights 
Gained from a Comparative Look at Egypt,” Studia Islamika 9, 2 (2002), p. 68. 
121 SI leader Sastroatmojo, quoted in “Neutraliseering en bestrijding van 
revolutionnaire propaganda onder de inheemsche bevolking, in het bijzonder van Java 
en Madoera,” AMK, MR 457*/1928, V 1 May 1929 C9, NADH.  See also Noer, The 
Modernist Muslim Movement, pp. 137, 235-37. 
122 Abdullah, Schools and Politics, p. 156. 
123 “Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand [1922]”.  See also Shiraishi, An 
Age in Motion, p. 245. 
 
 
 
 
RE Elson 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 01, Number 02, December 2007 
254 
At the same time there emerged a florescence of national 
consciousness that trenchantly focussed on the national, on national 
identity and culture, and on national deliverance from foreign 
domination, and in which Islamically-tinged ideas had little traction. 
The young Sukarno, though he had lived in Cokroaminoto’s house for 
many years and married his daughter, had clearly opted not to ally 
himself with the revised SI and under the influence of secularists like 
Cipto had, in the words of a Dutch official, “let Islam go”.124 In the 
Netherlands, a small, vigorous and increasingly radically-minded group 
of young Indonesian students was creating an unambiguous sense of a 
new nation, Indonesia, and the fact that it must be granted ―or seize― 
its freedom. It is arresting to recognise that as one leaves through the 
pages of its journals Hindia Poetra and later Indonesia Merdeka, one finds 
scarcely any mention of Islam. By contrast, while Indies students in 
Cairo, conscious of anti-British political action in Egypt,125 could move 
relatively easily to a sense of the freedom of their own homeland, 
theirs was a distinctly muted, derivative and still strangely vague and 
now dated sense of pan-Malay Islamic identity.126 
Not for the first and not for the last time, Islam was travelling in 
directions different from those taken by those who had accepted the 
supremacy of the idea of Indonesia. Cipto was characteristically blunt; 
after its split with the Communists, SI “threw itself on Islam, 
promoting the interests of which it made its single goal.  Thereby it is 
chained to the great world Islam movement, centred on Arabia and or 
Egypt.”127 SI was increasingly embracing exclusivity. A leader of the 
Bangil branch remarked in 1923 that “an organisation based on Islam 
may not mix with non-Muslim associations.”128  Salim made the same 
point when he remarked that PSI was “independent of any other 
                                                 
124 “Report Ch. O van der Plas, September 1927/March 1928,” in Kwantes (ed.), De 
Ontwikkeling vol. 2 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhof, 1978), p. 715. 
125 “Consul at Jeddah to Minister of External Affairs, 15 December 1928,” AMK, MR 
113*/1929, V 23 April 1929/N8, NADH. 
126 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, pp. 220-21, 234.  For correspondence between 
Perhimpunan Indonesia in the Netherlands and Cairo students, see AMK, V 9 August 
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association or body”,129 something also evident in his later suspicion of 
Sukarno’s federation of political parties, PPPKI.130 The claim aired at 
one PSI meeting ―“as soon is freedom is attained no one shall be 
named Regent who is not a good Muslim”― might have been 
calculated to create enmity and opposition.131 Laffan is certainly 
overstating his case when he remarks that “the seeds of what would 
become Indonesian nationalism germinated in two of the Central 
Lands of Islam [Mecca and Cairo] as much as in Leiden and 
Batavia.”132 Islam was always and increasingly marginal to developing 
Indonesian thinking about the national, something exemplified by the 
emergence of doctrinaire leaders like Persis’s Haji Hasan.133 The idea 
of Indonesia, as it emerged, had almost nothing to do with Islam, 
which provided little more than a vague incipient sense of solidarity in 
some places, and its opposite in others. 
The idea of Indonesia stood for nothing more than a free, united 
Indonesian nation, based upon the central pillar of popular sovereignty 
manifested in a “form of government which is responsible to the 
people in the true sense of the word.”134 That idea subordinated 
everything else to its service. Its champions frequently derided Islam as 
being opposed to modernity and progress and serving only partial or 
sectional interests rather than those of the nation as a whole. Gatot 
Mangkupraja thought that “in our struggle towards the freedom of 
Country and Nation, we nationalists do not wished to be caught up in 
disputes relating to religion.”135 Gradually through the 1920s, 
association based on ethnic or regional affiliation was forced to cede 
centrality to the increasingly dominant idea of Indonesia.136 Religion 
                                                 
129 Quoted in “Verslag van wd. adviseur voor inlandsche zaken (E. Gobée) van het 14e 
P.S.I.-congres te Pekalongan, 28 sept.-2 okt. 1927”, in Kwantes (ed.), De Ontwikkeling, 
vol. 2, p. 619. 
130 “PPO December 1928,” in Poeze (ed.), Politiek-politioneele Overzichten, p. 490. 
131 “PPO July 1927,” in Poeze (ed.), Politiek-politioneele Overzichten, p. 84. 
132 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, p. 2. 
133 Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse, pp. 137-38. 
134 “Beginselverklaring en Werkprogram” [Kusuma Sumantri’s speech on becoming 
chairman PI, 1923],” AMK, V 9 August 1927-G13, NADH. 
135 Gatot Mangkoepradja, “Kebangsaan Indonesia” [1932], in Soeharto and Ihsan 
(eds.), Permata Terbenam, p. 297. 
136 See, for example, Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 298, 299. 
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suffered the same fate. The fact that much of the debate about 
Indonesian identity went to matters of race ―for example, Hatta’s idea 
that “nativeness” rested upon ethnicity137― rather than religion was 
indicative of Islam’s weak political power. Within that new nation, 
Islam should have no more or no less an important role than any other 
religion. That ruling sense was captured as well in the deeply-felt 
notion, itself anti-Islamic in fact if not in intention, that Indonesia had 
always existed, that Islam was just only of many external influences 
continually reshaping that Indonesia, and that modern nationalism was 
simply a natural awakening from a long sleep.138 
Conclusion 
For concluding remarks, I would say that by the early and mid-
1920s, SI/PSI had become just one of many parties, and its reach and 
influence were in serious ebb, especially outside Java.139 The general 
impression given by reports on its status was one of declining morale, 
lack of funds, mistrust of leaders and sagging membership.140 It had 
definitively admitted the decisive power of the idea of Indonesia, but 
not the cluster of populist, pluralist, inclusivist ideas that underpinned 
it. In Cokroaminoto’s view, nationalism needed to be based upon the 
unifying power of Islam, which carried none of the divisive baggage of 
race, status and region—ignoring the fact that Islamism itself was a 
wedge against true national unity.  “We strive”, he said, “for the 
salvation of Indonesia, if possible of all of its people.” 141 Salim was 
himself even more explicit. While he asserted that “denying 
nationalism ... is certainly not Islamic,” 142 and that “the nationalism of 
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the Muslim neither divides nor excludes,”143 he saw Islam as “our 
national religion, which is certainly not the least factor in our common 
Indonesian national culture.”144  In the end, Islam was supreme; the 
real problem with colonialism was that “people cannot properly 
confess Islam, as long as they are still governed by a non-Muslim 
Government.”145 To govern the state, Salim proposed at a congress in 
Yogyakarta in early 1928 an “Islamic democracy” that was not “the 
Western one of half plus one, but this, that those who are capable and 
inclined to carry on the tasks of the state must have the opportunity 
and the power for it.”146 In all of this Salim was keen to oppose what 
he saw as the heresy of the worship of nation (kebangsaan) above all 
else. “Our love for the people causes us to honour and respect our 
fellow-countrymen but it will not elevate kebangsaan to an idol to be 
worshipped and adored.”147 Islamic democracy, by contrast, was the 
work of the people’s representatives, themselves imbued with Islamic 
principles.148 
By the end of the 1920s, the dominant political paradigm was 
inescapably that of the totalising Indonesian nation-state. Muslim 
politicians, too, had fallen under its power, and had to begin to 
contrive ways in which they could better accommodate their religious 
sensibilities under its umbrella. They sought them in a self-defeating 
emphasis on independent religious specificity in a context where 
national, not religious, unity had become the dominant currency. The 
problem for Indonesian Islamists, late to the table, was that they had 
no hope of popularising their ideals in a context where the nation, and 
not religion, was sovereign.[]  
 
                                                 
143 Quoted in “Verslag van wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (E. Gobée) van het 
14e P.S.I.-congres te Pekalongan, 28 sept.-2 okt. 1927,” in Kwantes (ed.), De 
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144 Het Licht, 1, 2 (March 1926), p. 102 
145 “Sentiment attributed to PSI leaders in Attorney-General (H.G.P. Duyfjes) to 
Governor-General, 28 October 1927,” in Kwantes (ed.), De Ontwikkeling, vol. 2, p. 641. 
146 Quoted in report Ch. O van der Plas, September 1927/March 1928, in Kwantes 
(ed.), De Ontwikkeling, vol. 2, pp. 724-25. 
147 H.A. Salim, Hindia Baru, 10 May 1925, quoted in Noer, The Modernist Muslim 
Movement, p. 254. 
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